

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 231440Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3761

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 16099

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, UR

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS CONSULTATIONS, SECOND MEETING,
23 OCTOBER

MESSAGE NUMBER TWO

1. MEETING BEGAN AT 10:40 A.M., OCTOBER 23 WITH PRESENTATION
OF STATEMENT BY STOESSEL WHICH FOLLOWS: VERBATIM: QUOTE:

GOOD MORNING, MR. MINISTER.

I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY NOTING THAT WE VALUE CLOSE
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT AND IN THESE
CONSULTATIONS WE SEEK TO ESTABLISH A COMMON APPROACH TO
ESTABLISHING STRONGER AND BROADER SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS
OVER NUCLEAR SUPPLY INCLUDING EXPORTERS WHO DID NOT
PARTICIPATE IN THE NPT IMPLEMENTATION DISCUSSION. AS I
AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE, MANY THIRD COUNTRIES ARE ALSO
EXPORTERS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT; THUS, A
PURELY BILATERAL APPROACH IN THIS FIELD COULD BE EASILY
CIRCUMVENTED BY OTHER KEY SUPPLIERS AND WOULD ULTIMATELY
BE SELF-DEFEATING.

GIVEN THIS SITUATION, WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO
PROCEED MULTILATERALLY ON THE BASIS OF CAREFUL PRIOR

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CONSULTATIONS WITH THE KEY NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AT PRESENT

INCLUDING, IN ADDITION TO THE US AND USSR, CANADA, FRG, FRANCE, JAPAN AND THE U.K. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT OUR PRESENT CONSULTATIONS WILL CONSTITUTE A VITAL FIRST STEP TOWARDS THIS GOAL.

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ELABORATE SOMEWHAT ON THE POLICIES WE SUGGESTED FOR DISCUSSION IN THE PAPER WHICH WE PRESENTED YESTERDAY.

WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST POINT IN OUR PAPER WHICH DEALT WITH ENSURING THAT PEACEFUL USES AGREEMENTS WOULD EXPLICITLY EXCLUDE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES, WE THINK IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR ALL

SUPPLIERS TO MAKE CLEAR THEIR CONTINUED DETERMINATION NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PROGRAMS, EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH EXPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGY.

THE SECOND POINT PRESENTS OUR VIEW THAT THE US AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS SHOULD SUPPORT THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS BY SUPPLIER NATIONS ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND SHOULD MAINTAIN AND AUGMENT WHERE POSSIBLE, THEIR VITAL POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

OUR THIRD AND FOURTH POINTS DISCUSS THE NEED FOR SPECIAL PROVISIONS AND RESTRAINTS FOR SUPPLY OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL OR PROCESSING EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ALONG WITH APPROPRIATE REQUIREMENTS TO ENSURE THEIR PHYSICAL SECURITY. WE BELIEVE IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE AND GUARD AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION POTENTIAL OF TRANSFERS OF WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL AND INDEPENDENT NATIONAL CONTROL OF URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND CHEMICAL REPROCESSING EQUIPMENT. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIES OF SCALE CAN BE OBTAINED FROM MULTINATIONAL PLANTS WHILE FURTHERING OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVE. WE ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL MEASURES -- ESPECIALLY IN THE IAEA -- TO UPGRADE THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR
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MATERIALS AND FACILITIES.

WE SUGGEST THE FIFTH POINT IN THE RECOGNITION THAT IN ADDITION TO THE GLOBAL DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, THERE ARE PARTICULAR AREAS OF CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN THE WORLD WHICH JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION OF STRINGENT CONDITIONS TO MINIMIZE THE ACCUMULATION OF PLUTONIUM AND OTHER SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

MR. MINISTER, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE ISSUES PAPER YOU PRESENTED TO US YESTERDAY HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED TO WASHINGTON AND IS RECEIVING CAREFUL STUDY. WE ARE NOT PREPARED AT THIS TIME TO OFFER A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE TOPICS YOU HAVE PROPOSED; HOWEVER, WE DO HAVE A FEW PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. WE NOTE IN PARTICULAR SEVERAL OF THE ITEMS YOU HAVE LISTED DEAL WITH SUCH ISSUES AS INCREASING NPT ADHERENCE, PREPARING FOR THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, AND OTHER MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE NPT. WE AGREE THAT THESE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THEM WITH THE USSR AT THE PREPARATORY MEETINGS FOR THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, AT THE IAEA AND IN SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AS APPROPRIATE. AT THIS JUNCTURE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD PREFER TO LIMIT OUR DISCUSSIONS IN THESE CONSULTATIONS TO THE URGENT QUESTION OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.

MR. MINISTER, THAT CONCLUDES MY STATEMENT FOR TODAY. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY SATISFACTION THAT OUR TWO DELEGATIONS APPARENTLY HAVE SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE NEED FOR A STRENGTHENED EXPORTER REGIME AND ON THE AREAS THAT THIS REGIME SHOULD ADDRESS. END QUOTE.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 16099

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

2. MOROKHOV NOTED THAT MUCH OF WHAT WE SAID MEETS

WITH SOVIET UNDERSTANDING. WE RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF THESE MATTERS AND THEIR TOPICAL IMPORTANCE. HE STATED THAT THE US PAPER REPRESENTS A GENERAL FORMULATION OF THE ASPECTS OF SAFEGUARDS TO BE DISCUSSED IN OUR TALKS, BUT TO MOVE AHEAD MORE INFORMATION IS NEEDED ON US PROPOSED MEASURES TO ATTAIN THE DESIRED SAFEGUARD REGIME WITH RESPECT TO EXPORTERS. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THEY WOULD HEAR FROM US ON SPECIFIC MEASURES TO BE TAKEN. HE STATED THAT SOVIET VIEW OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME IS MUCH BROADER THAN US VIEW AS EVIDENCED BY SOVIET PAPER. PARTICULARLY URGENT ARE SOME OF THE ISSUES NOT CONTAINED IN US DOCUMENT. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT US GOVERNMENT WOULD STUDY SOVIET DOCUMENT AND AGREE ON URGENCY OF CONSIDERING COMPLEX OF NON-PROLIFERATION MATTERS. HE STATED THAT CREATION OF A RELIABLE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME REQUIRES EXAMINATION OF ALL ASPECTS.

3. MOROKHOV NOTED THAT VERY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION HAS ARISEN IN THE SAFEGUARDS DEPARTMENT OF IAEA. THE USSR AND US MUST SHOW CONCERN THAT IAEA IS NOT PROPERLY PERFORMING ITS FUNCTION OF CONTROL, THIS IS ALSO URGENT ISSUE. THIS IS ONLY AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT WE CAN DISCUSS HERE. THE FINAL GOAL OF
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OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US IS TO PREPARE A LIST OF MEASURES FOR RELIABLE CONDITIONS FOR NON-PROLIFERATION. SOVIET AIM IS TO DEVISE A GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION SYSTEM TO ENCOMPASS ALL NUCLEAR ENDEAVORS.

4. HE THEN DISCUSSED THEIR ISSUE (NUMBER FOUR) OF HOW TO ENCOURAGE WIDER PARTICIPATION IN NPT, ESPECIALLY OF NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES AND NOTED IMPORTANCE OF ENHANCING UNIVERSALITY OF NPT. HE OBSERVED THAT US POSITION APPEARS TO COINCIDE WITH SOVIET POSITION ON WHAT CONCRETE STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN AND THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR SOVIET UNION AND US TO MAKE A JOINT EFFORT TO INFLUENCE SIGNATORY STATES TO SATIFY THE NPT ASAP. HE STATED THAT SOVIETS WOULD WELCOME ACTIVE US EFFORT TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE ON COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO THE US SUCH AS ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA TO JOIN THE TREATY. THE USSR WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE EURATOM COUNTRIES, JAPAN, ISRAEL AND ARGENTINA PARTICIPATE MORE FULLY IN NPT. A JOINT EFFORT WOULD EFFECTIVELY SERVE THESE GOALS. WE ALSO MUST DEAL WITH COUNTRIES NOT CONNECTED WITH NPT. ALTHOUGH THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY MAY NOT BE GREAT, THEIR PARTICIPATION WOULD MAKE THIS TREATY MORE UNIVERSAL.

5. MOROKHOV STATED THAT AS A CONCRETE STEP IN THIS DIRECTION, THE SOVIET UNION, US AND U.K. COULD MAKE AN APPEAL TO INCREASE ADHERENCE TO NPT. SUCH AN APPEAL COULD BE INITIATED ON A HIGH LEVEL THROUGH EMISSARIES SUCH AS EMBASSIES AND MISSIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

6. STOESSEL REPLIED THAT WITH REGARD TO SOVIET REQUEST FOR SPECIFIC DETAILS ON EXPORT CONTROL POLICIES THAT HE ANTICIPATED THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE AND STRESSED NECESSITY OF RECIPROCITY IN SUCH AN EXCHANGE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE SHARE SOVIET VIEW OF IMPORTANCE OF NPT CONCERNS THEY HAD RAISED AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES IN OTHER BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. HE STRESSED THAT PRESENT TALKS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON ACTION TO CONVENE CONFERENCE OF KEY EXPORTERS, TO CONSIDER MORE STRICT MEASURES TO
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STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS.

7. MOROKHOV QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS WAS FINAL VIEW OF US GOVERNMENT OR COULD WE ASSUME THAT THESE QUESTIONS WILL BE REVIEWED IN WASHINGTON AND MAY BE DISCUSSED HERE. STOESSEL ASSURED MOROKHOV THAT HIS REMARKS WERE BEING CAREFULLY STUDIED AND RESPONDED THAT PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO FOCUS ON EXPORTER CONFERENCE BUT HE WOULDN'T EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER TOPICS MIGHT BE ADDRESSED BILATERALLY IN THESE AND OTHER MEETINGS.

8. MOROKHOV RESPONDED THAT SOVIET VIEW IS THAT PARTIAL MEASURES ARE NECESSARY AND THEY ARE READY TO CONSIDER THEM, BUT TIME HAS COME TO TAKE BROADER VIEW OF NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES. HE THEN REPEATED SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER PARTIAL MEASURES AND EXCHANGE PROPOSALS, AND AGREE ON A COURSE OF ACTION. HE STRESSED THAT ALL IS NOT WELL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NPT, THAT QUESTIONS MAY ARISE IN THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE AND, AS DEPOSITORY STATES, US AND USSR MAY APPEAR IN UNFAVORABLE LIGHT.

9. HE THEN REFERRED TO PARAGRAPH TEN OF THE SOVIET DOCUMENT ON COORDINATION OF ACTIONS IN PREPARATION FOR NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE. HE OBSERVED THAT NO SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY WORK IS BEING DONE, THAT TIMERBAEV PARTICIPATED IN RECENT PREPCON AND ONLY PROCEDURAL MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED. SOVIETS DON'T KNOW WHICH WAY THE CONFERENCE WILL GO AND MEASURES

MUST BE TAKEN TO PREPARE FOR IT TO ENSURE A STRONG
NPT REGIME. THOSE COUNTRIES THAT ARE OPPOSED TO NPT
DO MORE THAN THOSE THAT SUPPORT IT. THIS IS WHY WE
MUST TAKE GLOBAL APPROACH.

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EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

10. HE REPEATED REQUEST FOR US VIEWS AND NOTED THAT
IT SHOULD NOT TAKE MUCH TIME TO DEVELOP A MUTUAL
POSITION. AT ANY RATE SOVIET FIELD OF VIEW OF NPT
ENCOMPASSES ALL THESE NPT QUESTIONS. HE ADDED
THAT THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD NOT BE NEW TO THE
US SINCE FONMIN GROMYKO RAISED THEM IN WASHINGTON
AND MET WITH NO OBJECTION.

11. STOESSEL REPLIED THAT WE HAVE NO DIFFERENCE WITH
SOVIET VIEWS AND ALSO WANT TO DISCUSS ALL THESE ISSUES,
THE QUESTION IS WHERE WE SHOULD DISCUSS THEM AND WHEN.
HE REITERATED NEED TO DISCUSS EXPORTER'S CONFERENCE AT
PRESENT CONSULTATIONS. MOROKHOV NOTED THAT WE HAVE
PLENTY OF MATERIAL TO CONCENTRATE ON FOR TIME-BEING
AND THAT WE WOULD SEE WHAT COMES LATER. MEETING
ADJOURNED WITH AGREEMENT TO RESUME EARLY NEXT WEEK.

12. IN ONE-ON-ONE WITH STOESSEL FOLLOWING THE PLENARY,
MOROKHOV STRESSED NEED FOR GLOBAL POLICY NOTING
DANGERS IN PARTIAL APPROACHES. HE STRESSED THE
ADVANTAGES OF DISCUSSING A GLOBAL APPROACH BILATERALLY
IN PRESENT MOSCOW TALKS. WHEN STOESSEL NOTED THERE MIGHT BE

BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS IN DOING EVERYTING IN MOSCOW,
MOROKHOV REPLIED THAT WE COULD BRING TAPE, PROTER
AND OTHERS TO MOSCOW FOR THIS PURPOSE, IF NECESSARY.
HE ASKED IF WE ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS WITH FRANCE IN
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EXPORTER'S CONFERENCE. STOESSEL REPLIED THAT THIS
WAS UNCERTAIN AT PRESENT, AND MOROKHOV STATED THAT
THEY HANDLED FRANCE WITH CONSIDERABLE CAUTION.

13. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH MARCUM, TIMERBAEV
SIMILARLY STRESSED NEED FOR COMPREHENSION, GLOBAL
APPROACH AT THIS HIGH LEVEL NOTING PROBLEMS IN
PARTIAL MEASURES. WITH REGARD TO IAEA, HE REFERRED
TO DISAGREEMENTS AT TOP LEVEL OF IAEA AND STATED THAT
IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS ON
IMPORTANT PROBLEMS. HE USED AS EXAMPLE THE
ASSERTION THAT NO ONE AT IAEA WAS CAREFULLY EXAMINING
REPORTS OF INSPECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, THAT
THERE WAS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF NO REPEAT NO
OBVIOUS IRREGULARITIES WHEREUPON DATA WAS FILED
AWAY AND NEVER STUDIED. HE ASKED IF WE PLANNED
TO BROADEN EXPORTER CONFERENCE TO AT LEAST THE
FOURTEEN ZANGGER PARITES AND INDICATED INTEREST
IN EAST EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. MARCUM REPLIED
THAT EVENTUAL, BROAD PARTICIPATION WOULD BE
USEFUL, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO INITIALLY
REACH AGREEMENT AMONG KEY SUPPLIERS WE HAD
IDENTIFIED AND THAT THIS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE
IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF ANY GLOBAL POLICY;
TIMERBAEV ASKED IF WE WERE CONSULTING WITH THE
OTHER KEY COUNTRIES; MARCUM REPLIED THAT WE
PLANNED TO DO SO IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND WOULD
BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM REGARDING ANY SUCH
CONSULTATIONS. TIMERBAEV CONCLUDED BY BRINGING
TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF SOVIET DELEGATION INTO CONVERSA-
TION, NOTING THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS
TECHNICAL DETAILS OF EXPORT CONTROLS AND THAT HE
ASSUMED THAT WE WOULD PROVIDE SPECIFICS NEXT WEEK.

14. RECOMMEND THAT SPECIFIC DETAILS ON ISSUES
PRESENTED IN US PAPER BE PROVIDED FOR USE IN NEXT
MEETING, ALONG WITH ANY GUIDANCE FOR FURTHER RESPONSE
TO SOVIET REQUEST FOR DISCUSSION OF NPT ISSUES.
STOESSEL

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